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Marx is reputed to have said that 
"there is nothing so practical as a 
good theory." Seventy-odd years of 
Soviet theorizing have left little 
useful practical theory behind, as 
demonstrated by the transformations 
currently taking place in Russia's 
borderlands. As the Soviet Union 
crumbles, the successor states face a 
unique and troubling situation. For 
over 70 years, their administrative 
structures have been centralized; their 
economies, transportation and com-
munications systems, and the phys-
ical infrastructure all controlled from 
Moscow under a coherent ideological 
regime. The successor states find 
themselves adrift ideologically and 
administrati vely, but the centralized 
physical infrastructure remains. 
How are these states to design new 
administrative structures? How are 
they to cope with the utter failure of 
their theoretical principles? How may 
they cooperate in the use of the 
physical systems while establishing 
their political independence? Soviet 
administrative theory-the "scientific 
theory of socialism" as it was called 
-has been unable to provide even 
the most basic guidance for the pro-
cess, and western administrative 
theory is not equipped to address the 
special problems of the new states. 
The insights of the neo-institutional-
ists can provide guidelines for these 
urgent problems. 
The Failure of Soviet 
Administrative Science 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s in 
particular, Soviet society devoted 
immense resources to innumerable 
social science institutes and bureaus 
that analyzed such topics as the 
"scientific study of society," the 
"scientific organization of labor," 
and the "optimalization of economic 
functi oning." Yet Soviet administra-
tive science was unable to leave any-
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thing in the way of a theoretical 
legacy. Scholars in the former Soviet 
lands find this disturbing, although 
western scholars, who rejected the 
conceptual underpinnings of Soviet 
administrative theory, are less sur-
prised. Gripped by centrist ideology, 
the Soviet academies could hardly be 
expected to design decentralized insti-
tutions and administrative strategies. 
More disturbing, however, is the 
realization that western scholars can-
not provide useful guidelines for the 
organizational changes. The rapidity 
of the changes is partly to blame. 
Some of the blame may be attributed 
to the fact that western theoretical 
constructs that should have wide 
applicability-market theory and 
comparative administration, in par-
ticular-have not been developed 
with sufficient generality to address 
the scope of the changes introduced 
by the fall of totalitarian govern-
ments. Finally, western scholars have 
failed to recognize the situation as a 
problem of decolonization. 
On a practical level, the need to 
define new structures is urgent. The 
withdrawal of centralized control 
from Moscow has left the new coun-
tries with interruption of commercial 
relations, a breakdown in communi-
cation and transportation, and an 
enormous environmental rectification 
burden. The aged Soviet physical 
infrastructure is incapable of sup-
porting the competitive entrance of 
many industrial and agricultural sec-
tors into the world market. 
Attempts to apply market theory 
in the new states provide a good 
illustration of the difficulties. 
"Privatization" and "transition to 
the market" are offered as the solu-
tions to the successor states' prob-
lems. In comprehending the dynam-
ics of these processes in the post-
Soviet context, analysts tend to rely 
upon the basic models of the privat-
ization and decentralization processes 
in western contexts (Bennett 1990; 
Cameron 1990; DeAlessi 1987; 
Fallenbuchl and Fallenbuchl 1990; 
Heald 1990; Ohashi and Roth 1990; 
V. Ostrom 1976; Pirie 1985; Pryor 
1991; Savas 1987; Schroeder 1988). 
Consequently, analysts speak in 
terms of "restoring" property rights 
and "returning" to the natural 
administrative boundaries that pre-
dated the Soviet collectivist experi-
ment. However, the post-Soviet con-
text is very different. In most of the 
newly independent states, the polit-
ical and administrative borders are 
artificial products of the Soviet 
period. Private property arrange-
ments have been disrupted for more 
than a century, first by Russian 
colonialism and then by 70 years of 
Soviet-style socialism. Indeed, in 
many areas there is no historical 
record at all of private property 
rights in water and agricultural land. 
In most areas, geophysical and 
cadastral surveys of the land do not 
exist and may never have existed. 
How can such land be privatized and 
deeded when there is no way to 
describe the property legally? 
In sum, the post-Soviet countries 
face the intersection of profoundly 
theoretical questions about defining 
the institutions of their future-ques-
tions that would seem to require 
careful reflection-and the urgent 
necessity to act quickly. At present, 
the process of institutional redesign is 
neither theoretical reflection nor 
pragmatic administration. The pro-
cess is being guided by politics. 
Decolonization 
Post-Soviet Style 
During the final year of the Soviet 
government, theoretical proposals for 
political reform dominated public 
attention. Concepts of federal reform 
vied with concepts of "refederaliza-
tion," "confederalization," and "de-
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federalization." At the close of 1991, 
the leaders of 11 Soviet Socialist 
republics created a Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS). This 
new group was ambiguous from its 
very inception: the founding docu-
ment (the Alma-Ata Declaration of 
December 21, 1991) declared the CIS 
to be "neither a government nor a 
supra-governmental organization." It 
seemed more an expression of good-
will, or perhaps the final piton 
before the successor states could 
scale an unfamiliar rock face. 
Each of the successor states 
received diplomatic recognition from 
major world powers and joined the 
United Nations. Each of the states 
has actively sought cooperative assis-
tance from international organiza-
tions such as the International Mone-
tary Fund and the World Bank. And 
each of the states pledged to uphold 
international standards of conduct 
such as the principles of the Con-
ference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (CSCE). 
Yet, there is great uncertainty 
associated with the futures of these 
states. Consider only the new states 
of Central Asia. All of these coun-
tries were created during the Soviet 
period; none of these states existed as 
independent entities prior to 1917. 
All are subject to strong centrifugal 
ethnic, subnational, and religious 
pressures. All are linked by religious, 
cultural, and linguistic bonds to 
countries beyond the former Soviet 
borders. And all face delicate and 
dangerous relations with their neigh-
bors over issues of border security, 
trade relations, and transboundary 
resources such as water. The parallels 
here with the decolonization of 
Africa earlier in the century are 
striking. 
Decolonization was one of the 
most significant global political 
events of this century. The "decade 
of decolonization" began as African 
states were integrated into the inter-
national community. In 1956, the 
Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco, and the 
Gold Coast (Ghana) won indepen-
dence. Guinea followed two years 
later. In 1960, the French attempt to 
establish a commonwealth similar to 
the British Commonwealth faltered. 
More than a dozen former colonies 
rapidly became independent. In all, 
47 nation states emerged from the 
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former empires. 
If this decolonization process is 
adopted as the model for the new 
states of Central Asia, it is clear that 
some of the patterns are similar, 
some different. As in many decolo-
nized areas, the national boundaries 
of the Central Asian states are artifi-
cial structures, adopted primarily for 
the convenience of the metropole, 
but no pre-existing national identities 
were associated with these states. As 
in many decolonizing areas, there 
were nationalist movements stirring, 
but political opposition was not the 
key to change, and no powerful, 
charismatic, heroic leaders were 
swept into power with a moral man-
date. Like most decolonizing areas, 
there was a stratum of metropolitan 
settlers in privileged positions, but 
those privileges were not associated 
with private property and did not 
offer any advantages after indepen-
dence. Like most cases of decolo-
nization, the metropole had grown 
reliant, if not dependent, on a flow 
of raw materials from the colonies, 
but Moscow had also extended its 
basic physical infrastructure of com-
munication, energy, transportation, 
and scientific research to these areas 
in such a way that both the center 
and the periphery were vulnerable to 
dislocations. 
One of the most compelling exam-
ples of the dislocation of government 
institutions is the political fragmenta-
tion of the highly centralized water 
management system in the states of 
the former Soviet southern tier, Cen-
tral Asia. 1 Now that the individual 
Central Asian states have sovereignty 
over their natural resources, they 
find themselves at odds with one 
another in a way that they never 
experienced while they were tributary 
states of the USSR. 
Central Asia's two main river 
systems, the Syr Darya and the Amu 
Darya, irrigate roughly 750/0 of Cen-
tral Asia's agriculture. Each of these 
rivers flows through three of the five 
Central Asian states. 2 Due to agri-
cultural draws, the inflow to the Aral 
Sea from the Syr Darya and the 
Amu Darya rivers fell to near zero 
by 1982; the desiccation of the Aral 
Sea threatens the local economy and 
the ecology of the entire Aral Sea 
basin, and it may have hydro-
meteorological effects on a global 
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scale (Micklin 1991). As long as the 
Central Asian irrigation system was 
under the control of Moscow, it con-
tinued to function without overt con-
flict among appropriators. With the 
transition to political independence, 
conflicts that were previously resolv-
able by fiat from Moscow became 
international transboundary conflicts. 
Water management is not the only 
issue generating conflict between the 
successor states. They also find them-
selves arrayed antagonistically in 
terms of trade, security, and the allo-
cation of other natural resources. 
These pressures result in greater 
demands on the new capitals to solve 
pressing problems. This tends to 
strengthen the "hard shell" of each 
of the new nation states, turning 
them to a dangerous form of self-
reliance when most nations are mov-
ing toward interdependence. 
Decentralization: In Search of 
Institutional Equilibria 
It is clear that the centralized econ-
omy controlled by Moscow has van-
ished and that replacement institu-
tions must be either salvaged from 
the old or created with new ideas and 
structures. The colonial approach 
used by the Soviet government did 
not encourage indigenous manage-
ment regimes and the Soviet-style 
bureaucratic institutions are en-
trenched in the new governments of 
the borderlands. The successor states 
are eagerly embracing market solu-
tions, although they have an imper-
fect understanding of markets and 
private property institutions. The 
level of decision making has moved 
out of Moscow and into the new 
capitals. The central question now is: 
once decentralization has started, 
how far should it proceed? Accepting 
market solutions and private prop-
erty institutions as defining optimal 
equilibria fails to give any direction 
in deciding the optimal level for deci-
sion making. The search for solu-
tions to these questions requires a 
return to the logical primitives of 
neo-classical and neo-institutional 
economics: market theory and hierar-
chy theory. 
Theoretical economists have 
emphasized the collective action trap 
encountered by collectivist societies 
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because of a disjunction between 
ownership and incentives (Coase 
1937; Olson 1965; Demsetz 1967; 
Alchian and Demsetz 1973; Axelrod 
1981). They have explored the theo-
retical relationships between collec-
tive management institutions and the 
phenomena of free-riding, shirking, 
opportunism, and risk-avoidance 
(Moe 1984; Eggertsson 1990; North 
1990). Recent re-analysis of the 
returns from the Soviet experiment 
of these past seven decades has pro-
vided convincing empirical evidence 
for these economists' theoretical con-
clusions: in the Soviet Union, the 
attempt to transfer all categories 
of property into the category of 
"public" property led to massive 
problems of free-riding and oppor-
tunistic behavior and, eventually, to 
resource exhaustion on a scale far 
surpassing that of societies recogniz-
ing private property conventions 
(Kaminski 1992; Kornai 1992). 
More recent work in the neo-
institutional tradition has led to theo-
retical breakthroughs regarding the 
complex interplay of institutional 
design and individual incentives (E. 
Ostrom 1986). Ostrom's empirical 
studies have documented how coop-
eration may emerge on a local level 
in some political subsystems while 
not in other parallel systems, without 
respect to the scale of the system or 
other external variables (E. Ostrom 
1990). She argues that the specific set 
of decision rules (how the problems 
of opportunism and free riding are 
addressed) determine whether a par-
ticular institutional configuration 
leads to optimal outcomes, conclud-
ing that self-government depends not 
upon a specific structural configura-
tion but rather upon the appropriate-
ness of the rules in use. Types of 
durable, self-governing political 
organizations may vary widely; none-
theless, the use rules of the resource 
system are not merely important, 
they are the essence of the system. 
Even once the dilemmas of collec-
tive action are clearly recognized and 
the importance of institutional design 
in solving the dilemmas is accepted, 
there is still the question of what 
principles should guide institutional 
re-designers. The boundaries of the 
authority of any particular level of 
government should be decided with 
respect to the contributors and bene-
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ficiaries of a good or service. The 
problem is two-fold: what level of 
institution most completely captures 
the maximum number of providers 
and beneficiaries, and what level of 
institution is most efficient in the 
administration of the provision of 
goods and services? Two principles 
guide the definition of these groups: 
fiscal equivalence and fiscal 
accountability. 
The principle of fiscal equivalence 
maintains that there is a need for a 
governmental institution (agency, 
body, committee, commission, collec-
tive, boss, and so on) for every col-
lective good with a unique boundary, 
so that there can be a match between 
those who receive the benefits of a 
collective good and those who pay 
for it (Olson 1%9). For example, the 
Central Asian irrigation systems 
benefit cultivators in all of the new 
states; the principle of fiscal equiva-
lence suggests that the institution that 
governs the allocation of irrigation 
water should be regional and trans-
national. Such an institution would 
be able to monitor water use 
throughout the river basins and could 
assess fees appropriately, without 
primary regard for the nationality of 
the users (Buck and Gleason 1993). 
Any lower level of institution would 
exclude some beneficiaries from the 
management institution, leading to 
some of the compliance problems of 
commitment, monitoring, sanction-
ing, and conflict resolution identified 
by Ostrom (E. Ostrom 1990). 
The second postulate, fiscal 
accountability, states that only those 
who pay for a good should benefit 
from it and only those who benefit 
should be required to pay: free riding 
and spillovers are unacceptable on 
principled grounds as well as eco-
nomic ones. Adherence to fiscal 
accountability may be relaxed in 
favor of redistributive policies, but 
even when it is suspended, benefits 
should be proportional to payments. 
Thus institutions must be established 
at the level that captures jurisdiction 
over the costs of provision and the 
reception of benefits. In Central 
Asia, for example, the benefits of 
irrigation have widespread economic 
implications throughout the econo-
mies of all the new states. Manage-
ment institutions constructed at a 
purely national level would not 
adjust to the costs and benefits in 
neighboring economies. The costs of 
misapplication of pesticides would be 
borne by downstream water users, 
and the rewards for water conserva-
tion would be dispersed to other sec-
tors of the economy, for example, by 
increasing the amount of water avail-
able for new housing construction or 
industrial development. With a 
regional management institution, 
these costs and rewards could be 
adjusted across borders. 
Clearly, these two principles are 
complementary. By defining a unique 
boundary for the good or service, the 
principle of fiscal accountability sets 
the parameters of the management 
institution as small and as low in the 
hierarchy as possible. By directing 
our attention to the possible ineffi-
ciencies caused by externalities, the 
principle of fiscal equivalence 
encourages the designers to cast their 
institutional nets more widely. The 
balance between the two is a matter 
of judgment, but deliberate con-
sideration of both principles fosters 
enhanced institutional designs. 
As the public and private institu-
tions of the post-Soviet world are 
reconfigured, the prominence of local 
politics in determining who decides 
what, when, and how may not neces-
sarily be bad. Recent empirical analy-
sis of Third World public and private 
interaction has offered strong argu-
ments that local politics may deter-
mine the outlines of local govern-
ment more efficiently than centrally 
driven campaigns (de Soto 1989). 
The failure of the collectivist experi-
ment in Russia and its borderlands is 
a lesson of importance for theoreti-
cians and practitioners alike. Any 
analyst who truly seeks to understand 
institutions, hierarchy, and collective 
forms of management cannot afford 
to ignore it. 
Notes 
*This article draws upon a larger research 
project on natural resource policies within the 
newly independent states. Support for this 
research was provided by grants from the 
National Science Foundation (#SES-914766) 
and the National Council on Soviet and East 
European Research (#806-13). 
I. It is traditional to speak of the southern 
tier republics of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan as the core 
Central Asian repUblics. Many sources 
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include the southern veliatlar (formerly 
oblasts) of Kazakhstan in Central Asia as 
weD. Contemporary common usage io the 
new CIS states, however, includes Kazakh-
stan as a whole in Central Asia. 
2. The Amu Darya flows from Afghani-
stan through Tajikistan, through Uzbekistan, 
into Turkmenistan, back into Uzebkistan, 
and then into Karakalpakstan before reaching 
the Aral Sea. The S)'T Darya flows from 
Kyrgyzstan and parts of China into Uzbeki-
stan and then into Kazak.hstan. 
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